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There are various situations, described in ethnographies of ‘primitive’ peoples, which 
are subject of interpretation and re-interpretation for they are not immediately 
comprehensible for Western anthropologists. When Evans-Pritchard (1956) reports 
that the Nuer hold ‘twins are birds’, the anthropologist is puzzled. If this statement is 
taken literally, the Nuer seem to make a category mistake, for twins do not belong to 
a category subsumable under or assimilable to birds. 
Cooper (1975) summarises the attempts anthropologists have made to dissolute this 
and similar problems. First, some explain such statements with the natives’ disability 
to see the contradictions or with a conscious ignorance of them in favour of other, 
non-logical criteria. Second, others have argued such statements are scientifically 
meaningless, hence they can not be attributed a value of ‘truth’ or ‘false’ since they 
have expressive, emotive or symbolic meaning. The third position regards the 
contradictions as a result of misunderstandings through bad translations or insuffi-
cient considerations of the context and background of the statements in question. As 
a forth alternative Cooper tries to proof that contradictions in some cases only arise 
by analysing the statements with standard logic instead of other, appropriate forms of 
logic. 
For further investigations in problems concerning anthropological analysis especially 
in respect of ‘strange’ practices or (seemingly) inconsistent beliefs, these four 
approaches shall be projected into the common conceptual dualism of the ‘emic’ and 
‘etic’ approach. In anthropology the concepts ‘etic’ and ‘emic’ often draw the 
dividing line between approaches allegedly from the point of view of the observers 
and the observed, the former applying the anthropologist’s own models the latter 
taking indigenous categories into account. The dualism often corresponds with 
various opposing schools of thought, like structuralist/symbolists, positivists/inter-
pretivists, universalists/relativists, etc. 
However, there are anthropologist who wouldn’t situate their work in either of these 
perspectives. Thus it is worth to analyse the ‘emic’ enterprise of grounding the 
analysis on indigenous categories and ask: To what extend is any project to ground 
anthropological analysis on indigenous categories at best irrelevant, at worst 
doomed to failure?2 
                                                          
1  Essay for the MA Course in Social Anthropology, School of Oriental & African Studies, University 
of London 
2   This was the essay question posed in the course ‘General Principles in Social Anthropology’. 
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I will be analysing two ethnographic examples. The first is derived from Evans-
Pritchard (1937) and was subject of a debate in the 1970’s. Cooper (1975) tried to 
dissolute contradictions in a set of indigenous statements by applying an alternative 
logic, where Salmon gives a more conventional interpretation. Parallel to the critique 
of Salmon on Cooper, I elaborate a critique on Eglash (1997) for his mathematical 
interpretation of a divination system in Senegal. The emic-etic-distinction serves as a 
rough framework for considering the questions about grounding the anthropological 
enquiry on indigenous categories or on allegedly universal mathematical and logical 




Evans-Pritchard (1937: ch. I) describes a set of beliefs among the Azande regarding 
witchcraft, which entails a contradiction. Witchcraft is inherited by the unilateral 
line; the sun is a witch if the father is one and the daughter is a witch if the mother is 
one. Since all Azande are related to each other, it follows, that all Azande must be 
witches. However, there is a reliable test, which detects post-mortem by searching for 
a particular substance in the belly, if a person is actually a witch. This test has given 
sometimes positive and sometimes negative results. Consequently, the statements ‘all 
Azande are witches’ and ‘some Azande are witches’ are both true, which is a contra-
diction. 
Cooper (1975) argues, that this contradiction only occurs when conceived through 
standard logic. An alternative logic was elaborated by Hans Reichenbach for the 
interpretation of certain problems arising in quantum mechanics, where some funda-
mental logical and physical principles stand in contradiction to each other. In order to 
guarantee the validity of some physical principles, which were in danger when 
following previous interpretations of quantum mechanics, he rejected for this particu-
lar case the validity of the standard logic in favour of the three value logic. It allows a 
third truth value, which is neither ‘true’ nor ‘false’ but ‘indeterminate’. Cooper tries 
to demonstrate that the set of beliefs the Azande held can be put in the same logical 
order as the statements involved in the interpretation of quantum mechanics. Thus if 
the premiss ‘Everyone biologically related to a witch is a witch’ is indeterminate, it 
follows from the structure of the three value logic, that the conclusion ‘All Azande 
are witches’ is indeterminate as well. The contradiction is resolved. 
Ron Eglash (1997) conducted his research in Dakar, Senegal, were Bamana diviners 
taught him their divination system. First they were reluctant to reveal the secret of the 
system to the anthropologist but when he explained them a graphical representation 
of the Cantor Set3 they were amazed and gave in. By drawing rapidly four vertical 
dashed lines in the sand the diviner created a random variation of dashes (fig. 1, 
appendix). Four of these ‘matrixes’ serve as the foundation and the lines are reorgan-
ised and summarised into symbols, which are again combined to get new ones. The 
entire procedure follows fixed rules, one of them is the recursive use of the mathe-
                                                          
3  In 1877 Cantor used a recursive function for showing graphically that some qualities are more 
infinite than others. 
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matical function ‘addition modulo 2’,4 so that 16 symbols in a sequence are created 
(fig. 2). Each symbol stands for an archetypical concept (travelling, desire, health) 
and belongs to a ‘house’. Through the procedure the symbols will be located in 
different houses. Under the influence of palm liqueur and marijuana, which improves 
the occult vision, the diviner generates a narrative out of the constellation, beginning 
with a ‘desire for travel’, for example, if ‘desire’ is in the house of ‘travelling’. 
Cooper and Eglash both try to approach indigenous knowledge on a quite unusual 
way for anthropologists. To analyse ‘puzzling’ phenomena like beliefs in witchcraft 
or divination in terms of mathematics or non-standard logic seems to be the strongest 
form of imposing Western models of thought on indigenous peoples. On the other 
hand, if these models are conceived as reflecting the objective reality, they are no 
longer a Western privilege. Are the anthropological analyses in Zande and Bamana 
grounded on ‘discovered’ indigenous or ‘imposed’ western categories? 
 
Salmon (1978) doubts that the Azande use a non-standard logic. He doesn’t deny the 
isomorphic relation between the set of beliefs of the Azande and the set of statements 
interpreting quantum mechanics, but questions that three value logic is applied by the 
Azande. According to Salmon, Reichenbach’s criteria for employing this logic is the 
untestability in principle of a statement. In quantum mechanics this is the case, since 
the measurement of one quantity makes it physically impossible to measure its 
counterpart5 and the other way round. Although it is not directly testable, whether 
‘Everyone biologically related to a witch is a witch’ in the Azande case it can be 
detected post-mortem if somebody actually is/was one. Thus it not untestable in 
principle. Hence, according to Salmon, the three value logic should not be applied.6 
 
Parallel to Salmon’s critique on Cooper, Eglash’s account could be questioned. It has 
to prove firstly, that the Bamana divination system could be explained in terms of 
recursive functions and, if this is the case, secondly, that the Bamana actually apply 
them. 
If we consider the divination system (fig. 2) it is obvious, that the recursive function 
mod 2 is not applied in every step of the sequence. Eglash acknowledges, that 
‘Recursion is generally defined as any iterative mathematical function in which the 
output of each iteration is used as the input for the next iteration.’ (p. 116) But in the 
Bamana case we don’t have such a simple recursion.7 After the first three depths are 
                                                          
4  To say it simple: modulo 2 (mod 2) makes of odd numbers 1 and of even numbers 0, e.g. 
5 mod 2=1. 
5  The measurement of the position p makes the measurement of the momentum q at the same time 
impossible. 
6  Even if Cooper ‘imposed’ the three value logic on the Azande, this can not be done in a funny 
constructive manner. Alternative forms of logic with n-values can not be constructed arbitrary. The 
meta-language of every logic is the two value logic, since every statement about n-value logic must 
be true or false (cf. ‘mehrwertige logic’ in: Klaus, 1972) 
7  A simple example for recursion is a mirror hold in front of another mirror and you placed in 
between. Say, the mirrors are in such a distance from each other that they reduce your picture to ½ 
of the original size. The recursive function is thus: f(x)= ½x. The mirror in front of you gets your 
picture as the input reflects it reduced to the other, gets it reduced back, throws it reduced back, and 
so on. Another example is the structure of a tree with it’s roots and branches, and sub-branches, and 
sub-branches, and .... 
do Azande use 
3 value logic?  
do Bamana use 
recursion? 
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generated (see fig. 3 step 1–3) the recursion would get at its end, if the diviner didn’t 
generate through recombination of the first four symbols another set of four symbols 
(step 4). This recombination is a rearrangement with no recursive function involved. 
With this additional set the recursion continues (step 5–6) till it reaches its end. 
Fourteen symbols are thus generated. With the last symbol of each set the recursion 
goes on (step 7). The final symbol is created by applying the recursive function on 
the first and the last symbol (step 8). Although this is a recursive step, it doesn’t lie in 
the nature of the recursive function itself, to take just the very first and the last 
symbol to create the final one. 
In sum, there are two steps in the recursive sequence (step 4 and 8) which are excep-
tional. This doesn’t mean, that the sequence can not be described as recursive, but it 
is ambiguous, unless not exactly specified by rules. The equivocal character of the 
divination system becomes obvious if we are to create a greater depth than five. 
Firstly, it lies in the nature of the system, that we have to create an additional set of 
four matrixes with dashed lines (with less then four there would be one symbol left in 
depth 2 or 3). But then it is not clear at which point to create the new symbols 
through rearranging. This could be done once, which leads to 24 symbols (fig. 3), or 
twice, which leads to 32 symbols (fig. 4). In addition the combination with the last 
symbol could be done in different depths, but the two examples above shall be 
sufficient to demonstrate the internal logic of the divination system, as far it can be 
analysed on the basis of Eglash’s ethnography. 
 
What does this mean for anthropologists? Since the Bamana sand divination is not 
unequivocal it could be argued, it was a matter of interpretation to describe it as 
recursive. One the one hand, the output of one process is the input of the next is a 
objective fact (which is the necessary condition for recursion) and on the other hand, 
there are steps allowing different possibilities if we are to extend the recursive depth. 
Similarly, that the diviners are consciously applying recursion may be supported by 
the fact, that they were amazed by the Cantor Set and that they sometimes employ a 
more elaborated version of this system, which shows, that they ‘are not simply 
applying mod 2 again and again in a mindless fashion’ (p. 118). Yet it could be 
objected, that they adopted their system according to the Cantor Set, what Eglash 
admits: ‘But it may be that the emphasis was partly done for my benefit, as a bit of 
mathematical translation to better fit the Cantor Set model.’ (p. 116). Of course, this 
interaction between the mathematician and the diviners could be interpreted exactly 
the other way round: It is not that the diviners merely adopted their system to the 
appearance of the Cantor Set, but they comprehended its inner structure and assimi-
lated it! 
 
In his seminal work Horton (1967) not only highlights the differences of western 
science and ‘magico-religious thought’ but also the similarities.8 According to Horton 
these systems of thought have in common the circumstances in which they are 
applied. If the common sense explanations, which are often sufficient for compre-
                                                          
8  Horton was often criticised for this comparison. Maybe the comparison of ‘traditional’ science with 
‘modern’ science or ‘traditional’ religion with ‘modern’ religion would be more methodically 
adequate. But this critique in not significant in this context, since it is for the question of everyday 










hending the world, are exhausted then new explanations are derived from higher 
level theories, scientific as well as magico–religious. Cooper agrees with this ‘jump’ 
people do, in the case of the Azande from two to three value logic. Opposing Cooper, 
Salmon questions that the belief system of witchcraft is a genuine high level theory. 
He refers to an example in Evans-Pritchard (1957) where the Azande do not derive 
from an abstract belief system concrete statements but refer directly to it to explain 
very concrete phenomena in everyday life. 
Consequently, Salmon suggests a solution of the seemingly contradictions by refer-
ring directly to details in the ethnographic data in Evans-Pritchard (1957). Witchcraft 
is said to be inherited only to close relatives and may ‘fade out’ or be ‘cool’, only a 
potential, but not a performative ability. Thus the Azande only believe the premiss 
‘Everyone biologically related to a witch is a witch’ on the first glance but actually 
regard it as false. Hence they don’t accept the conclusion ‘All Azande are witches’. 
Eglash’s analysis of the divination system has a functional connotation. In general, 
there is nothing wrong with that. But he takes no symbolic value of the performance 
into account although he mentions it. It may seem as if the diviners are only con-
cerned ‘with the infinity of possible futures and must show how they can be nar-
rowed down to a predicted unity’ (p. 119). Eglash concedes that the anthropologist 
may consider the diviners as theoreticians but ‘their mathematics is driven by the 
performative requirements of their work’ (p. 119). And in an elegant analysis he 
parallels the social context of the diviners and of the European mathematician 
Cantor, for as the diviners are outsiders in their society, Cantor was so in his mathe-
matical ‘subculture’. However, a more ‘classical’ account surely wouldn’t have 
emphasised the recursive functions in the divination system but may have focused on 
the ritual action involved. 
Durkheim established the distinction between sacred, religious rites and profane, 
technical acts. Compatible to this line Eglash’s analysis might have a Malinowskian 
connotation in a sense that social action appears to the observer merely as means to 
an end. The mathematical functions in the divination system serve as a method to 
create 16 symbols for generating narratives about the future. This technique may be 
superfluous, since the diviners could give an interpretation for their clients just ‘from 
scratch’. Anthropologists have often stressed the function of rituals for the mainte-
nance of the social status. Do the diviners merely perpetuate their status as gifted 
outsiders by performing the ritual of rearranging dashes lines in the sand? Eglash 
tried to persuade the diviners to reveal their secret by offering them high amounts of 
money. But they eventually give in not until he showed them the Cantor Set. Now the 
diviners could accept the anthropologist as ‘one of them’ and explained him their 
technique. But when they were going to reveal the last secret, namely how the 
interpretation of the symbols works, the anthropologist had to undergo a complex 
ritual (he had to eat a bitter kola nut, a chicken was ‘killed’, and more) ‘to compen-
sate for the harmful energy released in telling of the secret’ (Eglash, p. 116). This 
ritual could be interpreted as another evidence for its function of establishing and 
maintaining a particular social status. 
But maybe western anthropologist can’t understand important aspects of the action at 
all. It could be doubted if any analysis can grasp the meaning, the rituals have for the 
diviners, not to forget the effect of the palm liqueur and the marijuana involved ‘to 
improve the occult vision’. 
Explanation of 
divination in terms 
of ritual action 
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However, these various ways of interpretation should not give rise to pessimistic 
relativism. Lindholm (1997) characterises the postmodern enterprise by summarising 
Shweder, an influential psychological anthropologist: 
‘there can be no a priori way to give preference to any attribute of an object over any 
other attribute, nor is there in principle a limit to the number of attributes any object 
may be said to reveal or contain’ (p. 749). 
Everybody can give his account on divination and witchcraft, they are all equally 
valid and ‘true’ and ‘real’, since, as Shweder concludes (in: ibid.: 749), ‘there are as 
many realities as there are ways „it“ can be constituted or described’. And, as if this 
was not enough, there is not only no certainty how to approach the observed, now 
uncertainty is the virtue of observer as well, if we follow Rabinow: 
‘so committed to a doctrine of partiality and flux for which even such things as one’s 
own situation are so unstable, so without identity, that they cannot serve as objects of 
sustained reflection’ (in: ibid.: 749). 
Consequently the wisdom of anthropology should be: ‘all things are equally alike and 
equally different’ (Shweder, ibid., 749).9 We shall now see, whether mathematics and 
logic could be considered as a stable and reliable bridgehead for the anthropological 
analysis at least in our case. 
Some anthropologist assume the impossibility to comprehend phenomena like the 
natives do, we can just give various interpretations. Whorf (1956) may be read in this 
pessimistic way. He has put forward the argument for a strong determination of the 
manner the world is conceived through language. He found the Hopi language 
fundamentally different from the European, which form very different categories 
even for the basic understandings of space and time. Whorf wrote in the spirit of 
Collingwood (1940), who’s treatise on metaphysics supports his strong relativist 
position. Collingwood defines the metaphysics as a historical science with the task to 
explicate the ‘absolute presuppositions’ of ‘ordinary’ science. They mark the tacit 
statements on which the whole discipline or school of thought in question rests. 
Although an absolute presupposition is in this sense the very foundation of knowl-
edge, since ‘it determines the entire structure of that science by determining the 
questions that arise in it, and therefore determining the possible answers. Thus every 
detail in these respective sciences depends on what absolute presuppositions they 
respectively make.’ (p. 52) 
Collingwood stresses that metaphysical investigations can find the absolute presup-
positions in systems of thought but not assess them whether they are true or false. For 
if a statement is subject to the question for its being true or false, it ceases to be an 
absolute presupposition, but is a relative presupposition. Naturally this position can 
only hold its claim on a philosophical fundament which rejects the existence of an 
objective, independent from the human consciousness existing, reality. Once an 
                                                          
9  Such positions are so ridiculous, that one desires to throw Engels’ Dialectics of Nature on their 
desk and ask: ‘Have you ever heard of the difference between essence and appearance and the 
dialectical relationship between them?’, apart from the anger one has to swallow in order not to 
explode, in respect of the ethical ‘anything goes’–principle this attitude supports. 
 Lindholm (1997) demonstrates with an example derived from Heidegger in which a hammer is in 
infinitely different ways describable but has a rather universal usage which is literally intuitively 
grasped surely by all people all over the world. Here we approach one of the different conceptuali-
sations ‘objectivity’ could have in anthropological enquiry. 
Not ‘anything goes’ 
mathematics and 
logic as a legitimate 
bridgehead?  
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objective reality is introduced, consciousness and theoretical concepts are reflections 
of or derived from it.10 Consequently we can – at least for our purpose – speak of two 
different views about mathematics and logic, deferring in their claim to be derived 
from reality or pure intellectual constructions. 
What does this mean for the divination system and the contradictions in the set of 
beliefs in witchcraft? If we suppose mathematics and logic to be reflections of reality, 
it is possible that not only the western scientists but also indigenous peoples apply 
them. The Western ethnoscientist can ‘discover’ mathematical or logical models in 
indigenous thought. Eglash is fascinated by the manner in which the divination 
system deduces the variety of infinitive events to a amenable number of 16 symbols 
as a point of departure to create narratives about the future.11 According to Eglash 
‘the recent discovery of deterministic aperiodicy – as framed by nonlinear dynamics – 
maps quite well onto the traditional African conceptions of tricksters and related 
forms of causal unpredictability. Quantum mechanics allows the comprehension of 
events, unpredictable on one level of the material reality to be predictable on an-
other.12 Quite complementary, chaos theory deals with physical systems governed by 
predictable laws which behave unpredictable. Such research results suggest a dialec-
tical relationship between chance and determinism (MacGarr, 1996). Of course it 
requires careful investigations to examine whether these principles can actually be 
applied without confusing different levels of the material and social reality. But 
nonetheless can the results of science enlighten certain conceptions of cultures 
different from those of ‘the West’. 
Thus recursion and chaos theory could serve as a bridgehead to describe and explain 
Bamana divination and three value logic may contribute to resolving the (alleged) 
contradictions in Zande witchcraft belief. It then could be discussed if the natives not 
only apply these models (which is objectively assessable in this view), but are even 
conscious about them. Moreover, on this foundation it may or may not become 
possible to grasp the idiosyncratic meanings the actors assign to their practices. 
In following the contrary view, it is asserted that mathematics and logic are merely 
based on absolute presuppositions which mark a framework particular to western 
thought and different from other knowledge systems. Unless it can not be proved, 
                                                          
10 Marx is only one of the many different materialist schools. His famous quote may be interpreted as 
reductionistic: ‘It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the con-
trary, their social existence that determines their consciousness.’  Trotzky may sounds more dialec-
tic but this is, of course, exactly in the spirit of  Marx: ‘The human mind is a product of the devel-
opment of matter, and at the same time it is an instrument for the cognition of this matter; gradually 
it adjusts itself to its function, tries to overcome its limitations, creates ever new scientific methods, 
imagines ever more complex and exact instruments, checks its work again and yet again, step by 
step penetrates into previously unknown depths, changes our conceptions of matter, without, 
though, ever breaking away from this basis of all that exists.’ (all quoted in: Baghavan, 1987, pp. 
11). 
 I believe in a stratified concept of reality. The possibility in principle of the approximation of truth 
decreases with an increase of complexity from the atomic to the social level of reality (see Roy 
Bhaskar (1989) for distinction between transitive/intransitive objects of science). 
11  This reminds at interpretations of other divination systems. C.G. Jung in the foreword to ‘The 
I Ching’ (1967) refers to his a-causal principle of ‘synchronicity’ opposed to the diachronic princi-
ple of causality, which was merely a statistic truth. 
12  Werner Heisenberg (who formulated the indeterminacy principle of quantum mechanics) and Erwin 
Schrödinger: ‘And so we have the paradox [à dialectic!] that, from the point of view of the physi-
cist, chance lies at the root of causality...’ (quoted in: Baghavan, 1987: 72). 
applying models 
and being conscious 
of them 
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that the indigenous peoples in question apply (incidentally) the same models as the 
anthropologist, it is likely that the former use models incommensurable to latter (or 
the latter to the former!). Whorf (1956) has argued in favour of such an incom-
mensurability and the consequence for the western ethnoscientist is at best, that his 
mathematical or logical models make description or explanation only comprehensible 
for herself. She can not claim, to get an understanding of the subject matter (divina-




It could be questioned that the different approaches to mathematics and logic neces-
sarily have the impact on anthropological research of splitting it into two unreconcil-
able schools. Although there is no strict analogue relationship, this distinction 
corresponds with the ‘emic’-’etic’ approaches discussed above. In some respects this 
dividing line breaks down. For example, there are mathematical facts to discover. 
The Bamana sand divination system consists of 16 symbols which allows for 65.536 
combinations. This is a fact, independent of the human consciousness or one’s 
conception of mathematics. 
Additionally, arguments have been given for rendering the etic-emic divide irrelevant 
(Barnard, 1996). The conceptual pair has not to be comprehended as the search for 
underlying principles and governing rules on the one hand and the ‘native’s point of 
view’ on the other hand. One example to overcome this dichotomy may be the view, 
that human beings conceive the world through cultural or social structures, which in 
return shape their conception of the world. Thus, the individual perceptions are not 
that idiosyncratic as they may sometimes seem. Another argument might see univer-
sal cognitive (brain) structures responsible for similar cognitive (mathematical, 
logical) models of the world. Another position may hold, that the emic-etic distinc-
tion looses its sharpness, since all anthropological data has to be interpreted and emic 
as well as etic models are difficult to define. 
Leach (1954) has tried to overcome this dichotomy of imposed structure and actor’s 
meaning by asserting, that rituals make the social structure explicit. For Durkheim 
social action is either of sacred or profane type. Leach goes beyond Durkheim in 
conceiving rituals as having structure-functional and symbolic aspects: 
‘Ritual in its cultural context is a pattern of symbols; the words into which I interpret 
it are another pattern of symbols composed largely of technical [e.g. mathematical, 
logical, (M.S.)] terms devised by anthropologists [...]. The two symbol systems have 
something in common, namely a common structure. In the same way, a page of mu-
sic and its musical performance have a common structure [example from Russell]’ 
(Leach, 1954: 15) 
Eglash’s application of ethnomathematics demonstrated etic grounding perhaps in its 
most extreme form. He has shown how Westerners can at least approach the divina-
tion system in a way that it is not seen as arbitrariness. He hasn’t tried to interpret 
                                                          
13  If this was the aim of anthropology, I would like to see the western anthropologist, who is able to 
grasp the ‘world of meaning’ of other people living in his own culture. Can an anthropologist ever 
‘understand’ an internet-freak, a bank manager, a pop star or a child? 
Conclusion 
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symbols, but gets nonetheless an understanding for indigenous practices. And the 
diviners themselves didn’t see their system as incommensurable, since it could be 
learned if the anthropologist follows their instruction, although it could be argued, 
that Eglash was not interested in exploring his abilities for an occult vision through 
palm liqueur and marijuana. 
Maybe Cooper has taken the analogy of the Azande’s belief in witchcraft with the 
anomalies in quantum mechanics too far. But his contribution is to allow for the 
indigenous peoples a form of logic, where there is more then ‘true’ or ‘false’. How-
ever, in this case I agree with Salmon, who finds this is unnecessary and provides a 
different and more appealing interpretation. 
Referring to the etic-emic distinction introduced in the beginning, we can state: The 
project of grounding anthropological analysis on indigenous categories is irrelevant, 
if objective, ‘etic’ knowledge is to be grasped, since there are universal categories. 
On the other hand, it is doomed to failure, if subjective, ‘emic’ insights, totally 
different from ‘our’ own or, perhaps more exact, different from the anthropologist’s 
conception of the world are to be grasped. Apart from the fact, that symbols can be 
interpreted in various ways, we can never know, if there are some (spiritual) dimen-
sions which are never amenable for science. But if we do not have illusionistic 
expectations against science this dualism can be overcome.  
Horton (1967) warns the reader ‘from the trap which the Western layman characteris-
tically falls into – the trap which makes him feel he is keeping up with the scientists 
when in fact he is no nearer to them than the African peasant.’ (p.186) I shall add: 
Everything stands or falls with the questions asked if it is for knowledge about the 
material, social or spiritual world. For some realms of human experience there may 
be no way to approach them. But in general, anthropologists and scientists can get 
better insights into other cultures than the layman, if the questions asked can be 
answered at all. Equally there are ‘primitive’ theoreticians who can assimilate the 
world more adequate than indigenous laymen, when the questions asked are adequate 
to their models. Moreover, there are thousands of occasions, where the ‘modern’ and 






Fig.1 : four random dashes are drawn (Eglash 1997) 
mod 2
First Symbol à x4 =
first four Symbols













Fig 2b: The process is repeated four times, resulting in four symbols. Each row of the first
            two symbols and the last two symbols are paired off to generate two new symbols






1 2 3 4
Fig 2c: The four symbols are read sideways to create four more symbols (Eglash 1997)
            [This is non-recursively, M.S.]












Fig 2d: The two newly generated symbols are again paired off to generate an eleventh symbol





1 2 3 4 7 8 9 1 0









F ig  2 e :  T h e  f o u r  n e w  s y m b o l s  a r e  u s e d  t o  g e n e r a t e  a n o t h e r  t h r e e ,  w h ich  a r e  p la c e d  u n d e r n e a t h  t h e m ,
            c r e a tin g  a  s e c o n d  s e t  o f  s e v e n  ( E g la s h  1 9 9 7 ) .  M o d  2  is  a p p lie d  t o  t h e  l a s t  s y m b o ls  (1 1 + 1 4 )
            a n d  t h e n  t o  t h e  f i r s t  a n d  t h e  l a s t  ( 1 + 1 5 )  t o  g e t  t h e  v e r y  l a s t  o n e  ( 1 6 ) .  
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Fig 3: Divination System extended on recursion depth 6 (first version): One additional set of
          4 dashed lines drawn in the beginning. One new set is generated at depth 2.  
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Fig 4: Divination System extended on recursion depth 6 (second version): One additional
          set of 4 dashed lines drawn in the beginning. Two new sets are generated at depth 1.
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